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This paper explores the connection between neoliberalism and the capitalist 
classes in Argentina and Chile. In particular, it investigates the legacies of 
neoliberal reform for capitalist class formation, asking why capitalists were 
able to achieve a hegemonic class position through reform in Chile though 
not in Argentina. Albeit many historical commonalities, market reforms ended 
up producing different outcomes and reactions: a tempered neoliberalism in 
Chile that have only recently been contested, and a post-neoliberal backlash 
in Argentina in the wake of the 2001 crisis. These divergent paths are related 
with the outcome of market reforms and various other factors, including the 
capacity of businessmen to restore political and class power. The ideological 
cohesion, political influence, and symbolic power of the Argentinean and 
Chilean business classes are contrasted. I conclude by discussing the relationships 
between capitalist classes’ power and their capacity to resist collectivist attempts 
to undo marketization. 
Keywords: bussiness, politics, ideology, Argentina, Chile.
negocIos, polítIca e Ideología: neolIberalIsmo y 
formacIón de la clase capItalIsta en argentIna y 
chIle (1990-2014)
Este artículo explora la conexión entre el neoliberalismo y las clases capitalistas 
en Argentina y Chile. En particular, investiga el legado de las reformas 
neoliberales para la formación de la clase capitalista, preguntando por qué 
los capitalistas fueron capaces de lograr una posición hegemónica en Chile 
y no en Argentina. No obstante muchos antecedentes comunes, las reformas 
del mercado terminaron por producir diferentes resultados y reacciones: un 
neoliberalismo templado en Chile que sólo recientemente ha sido impugnado 
y una reacción post-neoliberal en Argentina tras la crisis de 2001. Estas 
trayectorias divergentes están relacionadas con el resultado de las reformas de 
mercado y otros factores, incluyendo la capacidad de las clases capitalistas para 
restaurar su poder de clase y defender al neoliberalismo. La cohesión ideológica, 
la influencia política y el poder simbólico de los empresarios de Argentina y 
Chile son contrastados. El artículo concluye discutiendo las relaciones entre 
el poder de las clases capitalistas y sus capacidades para resistir los intentos 
colectivistas de contrarrestar el neoliberalismo.
Palabras clave: negocios, política, ideología, Argentina, Chile.
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Introduction1
This paper explores the connection between neoliberalism and the capitalist classes 
in Argentina and Chile. In particular, it investigates the legacies of neoliberal reforms 
for capitalist class formation, asking why capitalists were able to achieve a hegemonic 
class position through market reform in Chile though not in Argentina. 
Albeit many historical commonalities, market reforms in these countries ended 
up producing different outcomes and reactions: a tempered neoliberalism in Chile 
that have only recently been contested, and a post-neoliberal backlash in Argentina 
in which national populist policies were lead by the Kirchner governments 
(2003–2015). While the Chilean businesses emerged empowered from Pinochet’s 
dictatorship, and managed to strengthen their hegemonic position during 
Concertación and Piñera governments (1990-2014), the historically dispersed 
Argentine business sector withdrew to a defensive position, especially in the wake 
of the 2001 crisis. Why? I argue that these divergent paths are related both with the 
antecedents of the capitalist classes as well as with the outcome of market reforms 
in each country, exploring how the differing fortunes of market reforms are linked, 
among many other factors, with the capacity of their business sectors to restore 
political and class power.
On a superficial level, the capitalist classes in Argentina and Chile may appear on 
equal footing. Both business sectors are characterised by the concentration of capital 
within family groups (Fazio, 2005; Fracchia et al, 2010; Undurraga, 2014). Most of 
the largest business groups in both nations are widely diversified, closely held, and 
family controlled (Schneider, 2009; Gaggero et al, 2014). In both countries the early 
experiments in free market reform under dictatorial regimes (1973-1990 in Chile; 
1976-1983 in Argentina) and the neoliberal policies of the transition to democracy 
triggered changes in ownership of wealth. During the last three decades, powerful 
local consortia lost their dominant positions. New economic groups emerged while 
some traditional ones were reinforced. Accordingly, the composition of economic 
elites evinces signs of continuity and change in both nations. Continuity, because 
capital remains concentrated in few economic groups, despite the entrance of direct 
1  We would like to thank the comments of several scholars that helped to improve this paper in 
previous stages: Goran Therborn, Ben Ross Schneider, Larry King and David Lehmann at 
Cambridge, UK. In Buenos Aires, the suggestions received by Mariana Heredia, Alejandro Gaggero, 
Ana Castellani, Alfredo Joignant, and the participants of the workshop “Elites económicas y políticas 
en Chile y Argentina” in December 13, 2013 were very valuable. Likewise, the comments offered by 
José Ossandón and Eugenio Tironi –the editors of “Divergencias: Trayectorias del neoliberalismo en 
Argentina and Chile” (Ediciones UDP, 2014), the book which contains the full material that sustains 
this paper- were very generous. We also thank the anonymous reviewers of the Revista Política for 
their comments on this article. Most importantly, we acknowledge Sasha Mudd’s contributions. Her 
philosophical approach not only clarified the writing, but also sharpened the arguments of this article. 
This article was developed thanks to the CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009.
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foreign investment; and change, because new economic consortia consolidated 
dominant positions, coexisting with historical family groups. 
However, if we examine the capacity of businesses to articulate a common 
agenda and the power position of private firms during the period (1990-2014), 
clear contrasts between the two countries emerge. While in Chile businesses 
from a variety of sectors were associated under one encompassing association 
–the CPC– and shared a common economic approach, and exercised both structural 
and instrumental power (Hacker & Pierson, 2002) to influence politics and regulatory 
laws, in Argentina the capitalist class did not share a common ideological vision, 
was not organised around one encompassing association and did not influence 
politics on anywhere near the same scale. For example, while Chilean capitalists 
were effective in preventing tax increases above 20 per cent through five different 
administrations in Chile (1990-2014), taxes over Argentinean export varied during 
the same period, rising over 35 per cent in some sectors. Likewise, whereas pressures 
from the Chilean business sector helped to maintain a labour code largely beneficial 
to private firms, a resurgent union movement during the Kirchner governments 
negotiated agreements on sector-wide wage increases as well as the minimum wage, 
representing a backlash against the labour flexibility of the 1990s. 
In studying the capacity of the business sectors to defend their own interest and 
operate as a capitalist class we are taking into account a relational, polycentric and 
performative notion of power. As Simon Susen (2014) points out in his 15 theses on 
power, power is a relational and ubiquitous element of human life that is reproduced 
through multiple networks of material and symbolic elements. Class power is 
polycentric, insofar as has numerous centres in multiple fields of action –e.g. social 
power, cultural power, economic power, political power, ideological power, to name 
a few. Class power is also understood here in its performative dimension, namely, the 
capacity to act upon the world in which the structural form of domination is not 
only imposed from top down but also reproduced from the bottom up. In light of 
the above, the historical configuration of the capitalist classes in Argentina and Chile 
are analysed in perspective of their links and influence to the state and society. The 
internal conflict within sectors for achieving dominant positions is also considered.
The argument is developed in three sections. First, a brief theoretical discussion 
about the concepts of neoliberalism and class formation that inspire this research 
are presented. Second, an overview of the commonalities and varieties of neoliberal 
experiences in Argentina and Chile in the last four decades are exposed. Third, their 
capitalist classes are contrasted at three levels: ideological cohesion, political influence, 
and symbolic power. I conclude by discussing the symbiotic relationships between 
capitalist class power and neoliberalism’s capacity to resist collectivist attempts to 
undo marketization, and also elaborate on the weight of symbolic capital in light of 
the corruption scandals and reputational events in which the Chilean business class 
had been involved. 
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Methodologically, the article combines a comparative historical analysis based on 
secondary data with 120 interviews, conducted with members of the capitalist classes 
and the cultural circuits of capitalism (Thrift, 2005) in both countries, including 
managers, corporate representatives, economic journalists, business scholars and 
consultants (Undurraga, 2014). These interviews were conducted in 2008 and 2009 
in Buenos Aires and Santiago. 
1. What is neoliberalism? 
Neoliberalism is understood here as a multi-dimensional and contradictory project 
characterised by the disenchantment of politics by economics (Davies, 2014). It is 
not only considered in economic terms by the retrenchment of the state and the 
privatization of public assets, but also by a broad restructuring of the state-market 
relationships and its attendant ethos (Peck et al, 2009). This restructuring is seen as 
a depoliticizing technique of governmentality (Foucault, 2008) and as a means of 
maintaining and restoring class power (Harvey, 2005). 
Rather than a succinct, clearly defined political philosophy (Mirowski & Plehwe, 
2009), neoliberalism is linked with various policy positions, economic interests and 
cultural practices. Perhaps most commonly, the neoliberal project is identified with 
a set of policies that encapsulate the prescriptive development stance of ‘Washington 
Consensus’ institutions from the 1980’s – i.e. the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, and the International Development Bank (IDB). These 
policies sought to increase competition –through deregulation and the opening 
up of domestic markets, including financial markets, to foreign competition– 
retrenched the role for the state, through privatization and limits on the ability 
of governments to run fiscal deficits and accumulate debt (privatization of public 
assets and cuts in public expenditure) (Williamson, 1990). In practice, however, 
neoliberalism manifests in multiple forms between countries and between different 
sectors within countries (Undurraga, 2014; 2015). As Maillet (2015) has shown, 
for instance, the state-market relations in Chile vary across sectors –e.g. electricity, 
public transport and pensions. Although those policies where inspired by the same 
neoliberal prescriptions at the end of the dictatorship, they took different paths 
during the democratic governments. 
As a term, however, neoliberalism gets used as both an oppositional slogan and 
as an analytical construction. Considered from the latter point of view, at least 
four interlinking dimensions may be identified as key features: i) neoliberalism as 
economic theory; ii) as restructuring ethos; iii) as a depoliticizing technique of 
governmentality; and iv) as a means of restoring class power. As I have argued 
elsewhere, I use these four dimensions to shed light on the different fates of market 
policies in Argentina and Chile (Undurraga 2014; 2015). 
First, as an economic theory, neoliberalism builds on the foundations of nineteenth 
century economic liberalism, that is, economic laissez-faire. Its roots are in the 
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classical economic thinking of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill 
and recent writings of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, among others. 
Neoliberalism claims that society as a whole is best served by maximum market 
freedom and minimum intervention by the state, claiming that such a situation will 
enable individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills to be maximally developed. 
In this context, the government’s role is limited to providing security, protecting 
private property, and creating and maintaining markets (Harvey 2005).
Second, as a restructuring ethos (Peck et al., 2009), neoliberalism attempts to replace 
political judgement and discourse with economic norms and methods of evaluation 
(Davies, 2014). Rather than a closed totality of ideas or a typological state form, 
neoliberal is here conceived as a private form of social rule marked by the dominance 
of giant corporations, the privatization of public firms, and the colonization of 
state services by new public management (Crouch, 2011). Understood in this way, 
neoliberalism is less typically concerned with expanding markets per se, than in 
expanding the reach of market based principles and techniques of evaluation. As 
Davies stresses (2014: 4), “the central defining characteristic of all neoliberal critique 
is its hostility to the ambiguity of political discourse, and the commitment to the 
explicitness and transparency of quantitative, economic indicators, of which the 
market price system is the model. Neoliberalism is the pursuit of the disenchantment 
of politics by economics”. 
Neoliberalism may also be used as depoliticizing technique of governmentality, one 
that effectively helps to de-collectivize society through removing the institutions 
that sanction public action. This aspect of neoliberalism was famously brought 
forward in Foucault’s lectures on biopolitics (2008) and Miller and Rose work 
on governmentality (2008). According to this logic, neoliberalism operates as a 
technique of ‘governmentality’ that aims to shape citizens’ attitudes and behaviours 
by reinforcing the autonomy of individuals as against the agency of politicized 
collectives. Based on the promise that markets will provide steady and increasing 
access to consumption in the future, neoliberalism aims to discipline both citizens 
and political elites, postponing the social demands of the former, and containing the 
internal conflicts of the latter (Guell, 2009). 
A fourth feature of the neoliberal project consists in its ambition to restore class 
power (Dumenil & Daniel, 2004). Harvey (2005: 15) argues that neoliberalism from 
the beginning was a project to achieve the restoration of class power guided by 
business elites and international institutions. In 1971 the labour movement enjoyed 
its greatest global expansion, extending the collectivization of popular demands 
(Therborn, 2011). The global economic elites generally regarded this largely anti-
corporate, anti-imperialist movement as having gone too far, calling for renewing 
the conditions for capitalist’s expansion (Crozier et al, 1975). Conservative think 
tanks like the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute linked 
their defence of ‘individual freedoms’ to the defence of free markets (Medved, 2012). 
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In this sense, neoliberalism would be a strategy for institutional transformation that 
promised to resolve the capitalist crisis of the 1970s providing new guarantees for 
the accumulation of wealth. The rising inequality across western countries linked to 
marketization and globalisation in the last four decades would come to confirm this 
feature of the neoliberal project (Piketty, 2014; Therborn, 2013). 
One way of conceiving neoliberalism that brings together certain aspects of all four 
dimensions is due to Mirowski and Plehwe (2009). They argue that neoliberalism 
is, effectively, a “thought collective”, where by this they mean a multi-centric 
movement anchored in a network of think tanks and pro-market institutions that 
connect political, economic and scientific elites. Some of the epistemic commitments 
that mark this “thought collective” are: markets must be built, they do not emerge 
spontaneously; redefining rather than merely destroying or minimizing the state is 
in the best interest of the market and those that profit from it; the best solutions to 
problems caused by the market are themselves market-based (e.g. carbon credits, the 
sale of human organs or vouchers for education) (Mirowski, 2013). 
2. Neoliberal foundations and social contestation in 
Argentina and Chile 
The question about the commonalities and differences of neoliberal market reforms 
in Argentina and Chile has been analysed from multiple angles. Both countries were 
subject to early experiments in free market reform under dictatorial regimes in the 
1970s. While the ‘Chicago boys’ led radical transformations under the Pinochet 
regime (1973-1990) in Chile, Finance Minister Martínez de Hoz attempted to 
implement an analogous programme under the Argentinean Junta (1976-1983). In 
Argentina, however, those reforms only fully took root a decade later with President 
Menem’s (1989-1998) implementation of the ‘convertibility plan’. During the 
1990s, both nations were held up as ‘poster children’ of the Washington Consensus. 
Following market reforms both countries pursued agro-export strategies, reinforcing 
the deindustrialisation of their modes of production (Schneider, 2009). Despite 
some of these capitalist commonalities (Streeck, 2010), the neoliberal trajectories 
followed by these countries diverged. 
In Chile, the ‘social market economy’ (Muñoz Goma, 2007) was supported by 
the political-economic elites, preventing major challenges to the ‘market model’ 
during ‘Concertación’ and Piñera governments (1990-2014). Concertación did 
not break with neoliberalism, but only aimed to temper it by orchestrating greater 
social equality (Silva, 2009). Despite structural inequalities, the improved material 
conditions brought by capitalist modernization –e.g. better quality of housing, roads 
and infrastructure, increased private consumption and access to educatio– helped 
create support for continuing the neoliberal model. However, since the cycle of 
mobilizations that started with the ‘penguin’ student movement in 2006 (Donoso, 
2013) and continued gathering momentum in 2011 with protests against for-profit 
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education, neoliberalism in Chile was challenged in unprecedented ways (Mayol, 
2012). Growing discontent with structural inequalities and a frustrated sense that 
the political class was out of touch with popular needs and demands produced social 
unrest unseen since the Pinochet years. Protests focused on access to education 
as well as environmental concerns (Aysén), workers’ conditions (Codelco) and 
consumer rights (La Polar), among many others issues, multiplied. Chile entered 
a new political cycle in which the subjugation of politics by economics is being 
questioned, with calls for building a more social democratic model (Atria, 2013; 
Fuentes, 2013; Atria et al., 2013). President Bachelet (2014-2018) was re-elected 
with a programme willing to move away from neoliberal conventions –e.g. reforms 
in education, taxation and a new constitution. While senator Quintana called to ‘use 
an excavator digger to remove the foundations of neoliberalism’, the advancement 
of reforms for undo marketization have been hugely controversial. In fact, several 
corruption scandals have dominated the agenda (e.g. Penta, Soquimich, Corpesca), 
evincing the renter ties between business and politics, and how the business class 
have captured the main political parties. 
In Argentina, on the other hand, neoliberal policies came under severe scrutiny much 
earlier, with the response to the country’s 2001 crisis proving pivotal. In effect, a social 
reaction against ‘market forces’ mobilized the country for over a decade (Villalón, 
2007). The neoliberal model driven by Menem (1989-1999) was associated with 
middle class consumerism, but also with corruption and unemployment (Novaro, 
2006). The poor performance of the Washington Consensus policies led to the 
collapse of the De la Rua government (1999-2001) and the convertibility plan. The 
governments of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
(2007-2015) subsequently capitalised on the backlash against the 1990s reforms. 
Their post-neoliberal politics reinforced the activation of popular actors, enhanced 
the legitimacy of the state’s right to intervene in structuring economic affairs, and 
strengthened economic and social rights (Etchemendy, 2011). Despite the positive 
results of the Kirchner administrations in their first decade, their confrontational 
politics engendered controversy both domestically and abroad. There were repeated 
clashes between the government and agro-industrialists over taxation and price 
controls (2008-2009), confrontations with the Clarín media group concerning 
television contracts and the media law, disputes with private consultants about 
the inflation rates of INDEC (Institute of National Statistics), as well as disputes 
concerning the nationalization of pension funds (AFJP), Aerolíneas Argentinas and 
YPF (Oil company), among many others. Until the end of Cristina Fernández 
government, the clash with foreign bondholders refusing to re-negotiation the 
country’s 2005 debt left Argentina in ‘technical default’. The ‘politics of agony’ 
that inspired both Kirchner and Fernández’s government, in which power was 
understood as the capacity to control rivals and weaken the opposition, ended 
up putting their opponents on the counter-offensive. In December 2015 the 
businessmen Mauricio Macri was elected president with a clear pro-market agenda, 
driving a counteroffensive over the Kirchners’ administrations: foreign bondholders 
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were paid, the National Institute of Statistics (INDEC) was intervened –suppressing 
the release of any public data for up to 12 months– and the prices of subsidised 
sectors such as energy and transport were adjusted to market prices. Macri’s policies 
represent a backlash to the Kirchners’ popular discourse, which society’s reactions 
manifesting spontaneously. The extent to which Argentina will move towards a 
more pro-market society is still in question. 
In the mainstream political and sociological literature, competing accounts explain 
why neoliberalism penetrated further in Chile than in Argentina, with multiple 
factors explaining these divergences. In what follows, I present a synthesis of 9 factors 
that help to explain the common antecedents and divergent paths of neoliberal 
experience in these countries (Undurraga, 2015). 
First, militarily, Pinochet was able to impose his authority inside the Junta, which 
facilitated a more unified approach to the implementation of radical market reforms 
(Gárate, 2012), while a lack of cohesion inside the Argentinean Junta prevented such 
an approach (Canelo, 2008; Boisard and Heredia, 2010). 
Second, ideologically, Chicago economists and their monetarist ideas penetrated 
far deeper in Chile than in Argentina (Huneeus, 2001; Dezalay & Garth, 2002; 
Centeno & P. Silva, 1998; Montecinos & Markoff, 2009). The ‘Chicago boys’ not 
only guided the privatizations in Chile but also converted the economic profession 
to a monetarist approach, which became the new ideology of the emerging business 
class (Valdés, 1995). In Argentina, by contrast, monetarist ideas were contested on 
ideological grounds at important public universities such as UBA, and failed to 
penetrate its school of economics (Biglaiser, 2009; Heredia, 2015). 
Third, the implementation of reforms differed. While the stronger industrial sectors 
in Argentina successfully resisted reform, forcing compensation from the state, 
the Chicago boys applied a shock programme in Chile which, despite recession, 
unemployment and business complaints, met little analogous resistance under 
dictatorship (Etchemendy, 2011). 
Fourth, economically, monetarist policies were eventually rejected in both countries 
on the grounds of their precipitating economic collapse –Argentina in 1980, Chile 
in 1982– but whereas Pinochet’s regime successfully resisted the social pressure, 
the Malvinas war defeat in 1983 buried both the military and neoliberalism in 
Argentina (Novaro, 2006; Cavallo et al, 1988). 
Fifth, in Chile, unlike in Argentina, the neoliberal institutional transformation was 
comprehensive –and its results locked in by the 1980 Constitution. While Pinochet’s 
dictatorship repressed the social costs of reform, removing the institutions that 
sanctioned collective action and weakening the workers’ movement (M. Taylor, 
2006), Argentineans, in democratic times, resisted the de-collectivising effects of 
reform, proliferating social movements and unrest (E. Silva, 2009; Villalón, 2007). 
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Sixth, politically, the technocratic political class helped build a neoliberal consensus 
in Chile (P. Silva, 2008), while the attempt to disenchant politics by economics was 
unable to disarm the collective tissue of Peronist networks in Argentina (L. Taylor, 
1998). The Peronist philosophy of popular participation reproduced practices that 
were in many ways incompatible with neoliberalism (Auyero, 2007). 
Seventh, neoliberalism produced different outcomes and knock-on effects: whereas 
material progress spread a notion of success associated with capitalist modernization 
in Chile, the huge social costs of the 2001 crisis buried neoliberalism’s creditability 
in Argentina, while the counter-offensive launched by the Kirchners further de-
legitimised the neoliberal project. Regardless of the maintenance of inequalities 
during the period, the material progress associated to the capitalist modernization 
in Chile brought a sort of symbolic legitimacy to the market model. In Argentina, 
by contrast, neoliberalism was associated to economic disaster, institutional chaos 
and the lost of social rights. 
Eighth, socially, neoliberalism as a de-collectivising project advanced further in 
Chile –particularly in the workplace (Winn, 2004), whereas in Argentina’s post–
convertibility the Kirchners reinvigorated faith in politics and collective action 
(Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2012). 
Ninth, neoliberalism partly succeeded in Chile because the bourgeoisie, the 
strata destined to defend capitalism (Schumpeter, 1942), was empowered by the 
Pinochet dictatorship (Kurtz, 2001) and then flourished during the Concertación 
and Piñera years (1990-2014), consequently, was better able to protect and justify 
marketization (Undurraga, 2013)2. This did not come to pass in Argentina, where 
the dispersed business class never rose to such power, and where they were perceived 
as accomplices in the 2001 crisis. It is this last factor the argument that I develop at 
greater length in the next section.
3. The relationship between capitalist classes and neoliberal 
reforms
The divergent trajectories of neoliberalism in Argentina and Chile is a multivariable 
phenomena that is rooted in the history of these countries, their social compositions, 
the economic outcomes of market reforms, and the features of their political processes, 
among other factors described above. A fundamental element of the different fates 
of marketization during the period studied (1990-2014), however, is the presence 
2  The Chicago boys in Chile were explicitly conscious that the formation of a dynamic capitalist 
class was fundamental for successfully constituting a market society and its subsidiary state. While 
privatization and individualization were central to the neoliberal project, only with a capitalist class 
able to compete in global markets and exercise a hegemonic position over the civil society, the 
subsidiary state was going to flourish. As Minister Sergio de Castro put it: ‘only in this way, we can 
guarantee that the state will become truly subsidiary’ (DIPRE, 1978: 382).
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of capitalist class hegemony in Chile and its absence in Argentina. Neoliberalism 
partly succeeded in Chile because the business class was in a hegemonic position, 
with varied types of powers (e.g. economic, political, symbolic, religious, intellectual, 
spatial, media) operating through interlinked networks, enabled them to justify and 
expand marketization. This was not the situation in Argentina, where the dispersed 
business class never rose to such power, where their ideas as an interest group about 
the economy and the polity were not unified and were hugely contested by Peronist 
movements and social reactions, and therefore their influence in the public sphere 
during this period was much limited. 
Esprit de corps and ideological affinity, close relations with political power, and 
good reputation in their respective societies are traits that all economic elites aspire 
to achieve. The ability of the business sector to influence in policy-making and the 
laws that rules businesses and the economy depend on these variables. Between 1990 
and 2014, the business elites of Argentina and Chile, independently, had moments of 
ascending and descending authority. Since the 2000s, in particular, their differences 
were remarked. In what follows, the power position of these capitalist classes thus 
contrasts along three dimensions: ideological cohesiveness (i.e. level of shared ideas 
and capacity to promote a common agenda), political influence (capacity to affect 
policy-making) and symbolic power (i.e. levels of visibility and social reputation). 
The three dimensions are interconnected, and help to explain the hegemonic 
position of Chilean business class, but not among their Argentinean counterparts. 
3.1. Ideological cohesiveness
While divisiveness and internal competition tended to undermine the capacity of 
the Argentine business sector to build a common agenda in the post-convertibility 
period (2003-2014), the ideologically consistent and politically connected capitalist 
class in Chile was effective in defending pro-business regulations during the 
Concertación and Piñera years (1990-2014). The Chilean capitalist class shares a 
common liberal approach to economic matters and a moral conservatism in its 
cultural values (Thumala, 2007; Gárate, 2012). Since the mid-1980s, it has aggressively 
defended market values and private solutions for public problems. Corporations 
invested in business associations and institutions that promoted free market values 
–e.g. pro-business organisations, think tanks, and economic media, helping to 
renew the justifications of Chilean capitalism (Undurraga, 2013). Different business 
centres such as ICARE and CEP, plus strong business associations played a key 
role in integrating and neutralising criticisms to the market model, while offering 
technical support for lobbying in the Parliament. The Argentinean business class, 
by contrast, was characterised during the period by diverse ideological agendas, 
rivalry and politicisation (Schneider, 2004). Different factions (e.g. industrialists, 
agro-exporters, financiers, commercialists and regionalists) defended their own 
strategies, strengthening their particular political ties and promoting their own, 
often competing, economic interests (Lewis, 2009). Although there were many think 
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tanks and business institutions aiming to promote business interests, their capacity to 
articulate ideas on behalf of the entire sector was much more limited. For instance, 
the annual business meeting IDEA (roughly equivalent to Chile’s ENADE) did not 
have the capacity to congregate all relevant actors nor the political influence of its 
Chilean counterpart. 
One of the striking rituals of post-dictatorship democracy in Chile was the public 
endorsement that political candidates needed from the business sector. Since 1989, 
when Alejandro Foxley and Carlos Ominami, the economic team of the centre-
left coalition Concertación, presented their financial programme to ENADE (the 
annual meeting of businesses), reassuring that if candidate Aylwin was elected the 
bases of the neoliberal model would be maintained, presidential candidates were 
expected to meet with business representatives to show their economic credentials. 
Meetings of this nature were unthinkable in Argentina, especially in the post-
neoliberal landscape of the Kirchners years (2003-2015). The deference that the 
Chilean political elites had to the power of the business class was inexistent in 
Argentina; the unity of the Chilean business sector to defend a common ideological 
agenda was absent among their Argentinean counterparts, and their public influence 
was also more limited. 
Both historians and entrepreneurs themselves tend to describe the Argentine 
business class as fragmented. Rivalry, politicisation and weak institutional capacity 
have characterised business associations in the last 60 years (Schneider 2004: 173). 
Different factions made up of industrialists, agro-exporters, financiers, commercialists 
and regionalists defend their own business strategies, strengthening their particular 
political ties and promoting their own, often competing, economic interests. Several 
businesspersons interviewed echoed a common theme. As one manager from a large 
firm put it: “the business community as such does not exist in Argentina: there are a number 
of entrepreneurs who are divided in their interests” (Interview 68, March 3, 2009). The 
lack of a sense of corps and the absence of a common agenda weaken the private 
sector’s capacity to promote a pro-business vision. 
A usual interpretation is that local businessmen are individualistic: “Argentinean 
entrepreneurs bad-mouth their counterparts, accusing other sectors of seeking political 
protection”, a scholar explained (Interview 85, May 22, 2009). Business representatives 
are accused of playing the odds for their particular benefit, without regarding the 
benefit of business interests overall. As the executive of a major company commented: 
“in all associations that I have participated in the only common denominator is the utter 
selfishness of the employer who lacks any concern for the common interest” (Interview 77, 
April 22, 2009). By and large entrepreneurs do not share a common ideological 
vision: disputes over exchange rates, taxes, sectoral protection, political preferences, 
trade strategies and personal gains tend to pull them apart. 
Some historians tend to link the fragmentation of the economic elite with Peronism 
(Lewis, 2009). As the studies of corporate networks have shown (Salvaj and Lluch, 
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2012), the Argentine business suffered a sharp division between the 1950s and 1970s. 
The social empowerment of the Peronist labour movement, with its re-distributive 
claims and nationalistic narrative, rallied people against the accumulation of wealth 
in the hands of the traditional bourgeoisie and foreigners since the 1940s. Conflicts 
of interests between business groups competing for state’s protection inhibited their 
capacity for a collective reaction (Acuña, 1998). Perón threatened property rights 
but also courted and exerted political influence over some segments of business. In 
opposition to the powerful UAI (Industrialists), Perón supported the CGE in the 
1950s, splitting the industrial sector. Further, state actors in Argentina denied or 
gave only sporadic access to policy-making, dis-incentivising collective association 
(Schneider, 2004: 194). Despite several attempts to build an economy-wide peak 
association, partisan conflicts, the inability to reconcile sectorial interests, and weak 
institutional capacity undermined these efforts3. 
Although during the neoliberal 1990s Menem gave free rein to business expansion, 
national industries in fact suffered from the introduction of international competition. 
As Beltrán (2011) points out, the lack of commitment to the Convertibility Plan 
within the heterogeneous business sector ended up increasing internal division. Under 
the Kirchners governments, pressure on the private sector grew steadily, with only 
businessmen close to the government benefited from state opportunities (for a picture 
of the shifts within the business class and the divergent strategies that old and new 
economic groups took during the post-convertibility years, see Gaggero et al 2014). 
Despite these historical antecedents, the fragmentation of the Argentine business sector 
during the Kirchner years is partly explained by the aggressive environment in which 
they operated. As former minister Juan Llach observed: “entrepreneurs individually seek 
to save their companies from not being punished by the government with a tax inspection or 
price controls. Employers react defensively. Having a public profile might be risky” (Interview 
80, May 12, 2009). In this adverse environment, the strategy of many entrepreneurs 
rather than collective tended to be “every one saves for himself”.
The divisiveness of the Argentinean business class starkly contrasts with the 
ideological unity displayed by its Chilean counterpart. The Chilean ‘business 
community’, as its members referred to it during the period, was characterised by a 
common liberal approach to economic matters and a shared moral conservatism in 
its cultural values (Thumala, 2007; Gárate, 2012). Informal networks that combine 
social and instrumental relations also served to strengthen the defence of class 
interests. A strong social system based on family relations, colleagues from college 
and university, religious groups, chains of capital, and shared business interests 
3  Schneider (2004: 174) argues that several coordinated initiatives from businesses lasted only until 
the perception of threat passed, usually after the military had removed the offending government. 
Since the return of democracy, temporary bodies such as ‘grupo de los 11 (1984-1985)’, ‘grupo de 
los 17 (1987-1988)’, ‘grupo de los 8 (1987-1989)’ or the ‘captains of the industry’ were not able to 
last either. 
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connected economic elites. More importantly, a common core of ideological ideas 
about the economy and society was largely shared within main business actors. 
Chilean capitalists had a markedly right-wing orientation during the period. 
Pinochet’s regime triggered an ideological revolution for the business class, who, 
despite internal heterogeneity and variety of agendas, managed to become a 
unified sector. This unification was achieved in part through the influence of the 
Chicago Boys (Valdés, 1995). The economic program written by these economists 
–‘the Brick’- served not only as a practical guide for implementing the privatising 
reforms, but also as an ideological device to re-educate and unite Chilean capitalists 
(Tironi, 2013). But this was not an easy transformation. Entrepreneurs supported 
the military coup not only seeking to defend private property and restore order, 
but also to placate leftist parties and an organised civil society that threatened the 
power of elites (Schneider, 2004). The unprecedented unity among the business 
sectors before the coup was broken after the shock polices implemented in 1975 
(Montero, 1997). The policies of the Chicago Boys were originally resisted by small 
and medium-sized industries, who used to a capitalism protected by the state were 
forced to compete. The trade liberalisation promoted by the regime produced the 
collapse of many companies and the financial crisis of 1982, generating resistance to 
monetarism. Market reforms started gaining transversal support within the business 
establishment only by 1985, after the economic recovery and the stabilisation of the 
reforms (Cavallo et al, 1988). 
Many business representatives played official roles in Pinochet regime since the 
mid-1980s, which for Arriagada (2004) makes them the most ideologically driven 
economic elite in the region. Until the mid-2000s, many of them maintained key 
positions in several corporate boards, such as AFPs, position from which they not 
only defended the market model with arguments, but also administrated the Chilean 
pensions funds with neoliberal priorities (Huneeus, 2014: 350). Despite the marked 
right wing position of Chilean businessmen, a natural generational replacement 
added new executives to firms whose careers were less marked by historical political 
divisions and who brought more technical approaches to management. Further, 
business associations realised that such visibly marked right wing political affiliation 
did not facilitate their relations with centre-left governments. Since the 2000s, new 
business representatives, such as Felipe Lamarca, Juan Claro and Rafael Guillisasti, 
renewed the tone of SOFOFA and CPC, increasing collaboration between 
Concertación government and businesses. Having said that, Chilean businessmen 
did not change their views about the relationships between capital and labour. 
They maintained a persistent view of subordinating labour organization to capital 
interests. The demonization of workers’ unions and employers’ rights as a danger 
for the country’s growth and the attraction of investment was a constant argument 
from business representatives across sectors and from different ages between 1990 
and 2014 (Huneeus, 2014; Undurraga, 2014; Álvarez, 2015). 
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The ideological affinity of the Chilean business class was not a spontaneous 
achievement. Since the 1980s, an ideological offensive to justify the new neoliberal 
order and the emerging capitalist class was launched by the private sector. 
Corporations invested in business associations and institutions that celebrated the 
economic success of the ‘exporter model’ and promoted free market values. These 
institutions formed what Thrift (2005) calls ‘cultural circuit of capitalism’, based 
on strong networks of enterprises, pro-business organisations, think tanks, private 
universities, and the economic media (Undurraga, 2013). Different business centres 
such as ICARE and CEP, plus strong business associations (CPC, SOFOFA, SNA, 
CCHC), play a strong role in these circuits, and operate as meeting points, promoting 
a business agenda, while offering technical support for regulatory lobbying in the 
Parliament. ICARE, and its ongoing activities, became particularly influential 
in this regard. As right-wing politician Joaquín Lavín pointed out: “The boom of 
ICARE started in the late 80’s, and ENADE (ICARE’s annual meeting) became a 
landmark. It’s the day the whole economy stops, when hundreds of executives, the whole PGB 
meet, and authorities make their announcements” (Interview 34, December 12, 2008). 
These circuits have facilitated the defence of the market model and strengthened 
the morale of the business class, making Chilean capitalism more sophisticated 
and reactive. A pervasive discourse about innovation, entrepreneurship and social 
responsibility –the new spirit of capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005) of the 
Chilean neoliberal model– celebrates the private sector’s social role, emphasising 
the generation of employment, reduction of poverty and the modernisation of the 
country (Undurraga, 2014). As the CEO of a large firm put it, “business ideals are 
spread through business associations. At CPC, Ancham or Sofofa, managers compare practices 
and generate benchmarks” (Interview 11, October 2, 2008). 
The closest the Argentinean business class has to an organisation like ICARE is an 
annual meeting of businessmen called IDEA. This forum, however, is an isolated 
activity that has no capacity to convene political actors, limiting its impact to the 
business sector. IDEA grew with the boom of the 1960s and the demand from 
corporations for more sophisticated managers. Despite the strengthening of 
corporations during the 90s, the business sector failed to build a common ideological 
agenda –e.g. the convertibility plan never fully seduced industrialists. In the words 
of a business consultant with experience in both countries, “IDEA is a conference 
where businessmen come together once a year, and you look at the faces of the crowd, and say: 
you’re my friend, you’re my enemy. It is nothing like ICARE and the rituals of the Chilean 
business community” (Interview 81, May 15, 2009). Particularly after the collapse 
of 2001, business associations, economic consultants and liberal think tanks –the 
Argentinean cultural circuits of capitalism– retrenched to a defensive position. In 
the post-convertibility years, the ‘expert’ economic voices of the 1990s refuged 
in private universities and consulting firms, where they were less visible to the 
public sphere. It was only after the clashes between the Kirchner government and 
agro-exporters in 2008 and the disputes about the intervention of public numbers 
(INDEC) that they regained certain public presence. The economic difficulties in 
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which Cristina Fernández’s government finished in 2015 gave plenty of room for 
these pro-market experts to regain visibility and credibility. It is still too fresh to 
assess the extent to which the businessmen and pro-business thinkers linked with 
Mauricio Macri’s government will help to build a common ideological agenda for 
the dispersed Argentinean business sector. 
3.2. Political influence
Two traditional ways in which the businesses classes attempt to affect policy making 
is through exercising instrumental and structural power (Fairfield, 2015; Hacker & 
Pierson, 2002). Instrumental power entails political action to affect policy, such as 
lobbying, recruitment into government, government-business cooperation, and 
partisan linkages. Structural power acts primarily by restricting the agenda from a 
perceived disinvestment threat by the private sector –the so-called ‘capital strike’. In 
comparing the capacity of the business classes to access to government and affect 
policy-making in Argentina and Chile between 1990 and 2014, the differences sparkle.
Capitalists in these countries have differing levels of access to government, and, 
therefore, different capacities to defend their interests in the political arena. While 
the coordinated Chilean business associations have been a regular source of 
consultation in government policy-making since the mid-1980s, their Argentine 
counterparts have been largely marginalised from policy discussion (Schneider, 
2004). While different Argentine governments encouraged the flourishing of some 
conglomerates over others, the private sector in Chile remained associated with 
right-wing parties and developed strategic links with Concertación representatives, 
who strongly back the business agenda. Between 2010 and 2014, the business sector 
arrived at the pinnacle of political power in Chile with the ascension of businessmen 
Piñera to the presidency.
Business associations in Chile (SOFOFA, SNA, CCHC), gathered under the 
umbrella of the Confederation for Production and Commerce (CPC), were 
powerful actors with strong authority in the public arena, and an impressive capacity 
to coordinate divergent sectors (i.e. agro-business, banks, mining, construction or 
industry) during this period (1990-2014). The common agenda of the business 
sector did not mean the absence of disputes between different branches. In fact, 
as Álvarez (2015) has shown, political disputes within the sector were a constant 
pattern during the period. However, at the moment of negotiating with political 
authorities, the position of the sector converged. One of the greatest examples is 
labour reform, an issue that unified various business associations in maintaining a 
very flexible labour market4. 
4  For instance, the Heritage Foundation’s 2011 ‘Labour Freedom’ rankings put Argentina 137th out 
of 179 countries. Chile, by contrast, is ranked at 48th. Labour is more flexible and vulnerable in 
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Access to government consultation is not a given pattern of business association 
in Chile. Until the 1982 crisis, the Chicago boys had displaced industry leaders 
from consultation on policy-making. The destructive 1982-83 crisis, however, 
had a solidifying effect on the business sector, which reacted by strengthening 
its encompassing association, CPC, and making it more influential in economic 
policy (E. Silva, 1996). In addition to the appointment of Büchi as finance minister, 
Pinochet appointed more business representatives in 1985 (e.g. Collado, Délano), 
assuring the support of the private sector. Since then, channels of collaboration 
and consultation between the government and business associations have been 
open and free-flowing (Schneider, 2004). The fact of having such strong influence 
on policy-making stimulated the private sector to invest in their associations –by 
professionalising their staff and technical departments (E. Silva, 1998). Well-funded 
business associations subsequently developed multiple institutional channels to 
increase their participation in policy-making, exercising both instrumental and 
structural power. 
In addition, partisan linkages with right wing parties Unión Demócrata Independiente 
(UDI) and Renovación Nacional (RN), and strategic links with Concertación 
politicians, facilitated the defence of business interests in the Parliament, such as 
maintenance of low taxation and a flexible labour market. Due to the strong structural 
power of the private sector, Concertación governments (1990-2010) felt the need 
to consult with business associations on economic reforms. Political and technical 
skills were used by Concertación technopols (Joignant, 2011) in order to avoid 
conflicts with businesses. Collaboration between business and government led to 
the distributive reforms implemented during the 1990s, as well as the capital reforms 
implemented in the 2000s. For instance, both Leyes de Mercado de Capitales I y II 
during the Lagos and Bachelet administrations were based on proposals made by the 
industrial association SOFOFA. The power of businesses and the right wing sector 
–overrepresented in parliament due to the binominal system– constrained further, 
more progressive policy changes. Additionally, affluent firms financed legally and 
illegally parties on the right and left side of the spectrum. The unveiled scandals in 
recent years –e.g. SQM, Penta and Corpesca, to name a few– showed not only gross 
bribery practices, but also the way in which business interests colonized the political 
machinery, towing the laws towards its own interests. Unsurprisingly, none of the key 
reforms of the Concertación governments-tax (Aylwin), state modernisation (Frei), 
health (Lagos), and pensions (Bachelet) were as progressive as they were originally 
believed to be, achieving only a partial correction of neoliberalism’s inequities 
(Garretón, 2012). During Piñera’s administration, businesses interests were directly 
represented in government, which in practice meant that CEO’s –such Patricio 
Chile. Firms contract and dismiss labour with fewer constraints. State intervention in the form of 
wage control, as well as hiring and firing restrictions is lower compared with Argentina.
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Contesse from Soquimich– wrote directly to the Ministry of Economy –Pablo 
Longueira– the law that rules the mining sector. 
Critical observers point out that the capitalist class in Chile succeeded in imposing 
its particular interests under the banner of the national interest, and in this way 
exercising their structural power (Ljubetic, 2008). When serious public discussion 
of economic reform and labour issues were debated, the business sector routinely 
defended its interests by arguing that any threat to business is a threat to the country’s 
stability for instance, Alfredo Ovalle, president of the CPC, argued in his speech of 
Enade 2007: 
Today Chile breathes a rarefied air, where distrust appears increasingly 
prevalent... We are concerned about the uncertainty regarding initiatives in 
labour law, which undermine the confidence of business (Ovalle, 2007). 
The constant threats of business representatives that democratic reform –e.g. 
labour relationships, pension funds, taxation– disincentive economic growth and 
investment speak volume of the structural power of the sector. The different ways 
in which business associations influenced policy making in Chile reflects their 
instrumental power. But perhaps the greatest example of neoliberal success that 
echoes the hegemonic position of the business class in Chile during the period was 
how the rationality of the private sector (the politics of expertise) was inculcated 
in state institutions, affecting the way in which the polity was thought and planned 
(private solutions for public necessities), achieving the disenchantment of politics by 
economics described by Davies (2014). 
The situation contrasts starkly with that in Argentina. Big businesses did not enjoy 
the protection of a tough partisan ally, such as the Chilean RN and UDI. Business 
associations were not gathered under one common multi-business association. 
Weaker business power facilitated significant reform, although specific sectors, 
including finance and agriculture, occasionally had instrumental and/or structural 
power to defend their interests (Fairfield, 2015). Despite the existence of several 
business associations, such as SRA (Sociedad Rural Argentina), UAI (Union 
Industrial Argentina) and ADEBA (Asociación de Bancos Argentinos), there were 
internal factions competing for influence over public policy: ranchers versus farmers, 
manufacturing versus construction, wholesalers versus retailers, foreign companies 
versus domestic, large firms versus small (Lewis, 2009). 
The Argentinean economic elites showed little consensus around a common 
economic model and had difficulty forming strategic political alliances for or against 
particular plans. Thus economic sectors tended to lobby in Congress with their 
own agendas (Etchemendy, 2011). Since businesses did not operate under a stable 
economy-wide association, governments had more opportunities to impose their 
preferences, changing regulatory frames, scrutinising firms’ financial movements and 
passing bills for increasing corporate taxes whenever it was politically expedient to 
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do so. This situation was particularly visible during the Kirchner years. The links 
between business and government were often individualised and informal: “mediated 
by personal networks, legislative lobbying, campaign contributions, and corruption” 
(Schneider, 2010: 309). As a result, business associations did not have the capacity to 
influence governance at industry level to anywhere near a comparable degree. 
Between 1990-2014, different government coalitions tended to promote particular 
entrepreneurs, and displace others, generating competition for state links between 
conglomerates, or what Castellani (2009) calls privileged spheres of accumulation. 
The arrival of a new government can be counted on to favour some business 
groups over others. The Kirchner governments were particularly tough on the 
private sector, showing special hostility to international capital and entrepreneurs 
strengthened in the Menem years, while favouring entrepreneurs close to their 
circles. As a business scholar emphasised: “Pérez Compac, Bunge & Born, Fortabat, 
Macri and Loma Negra were economic groups that flourished under Menem governments, but 
have serious conflicts with the current administration” (Interview 88, June 5, 2009). Under 
the Kirchner governments (2003-2015), in particular, pressure on the private sector 
grew steadily. Public service contracts with privatized utilities were renegotiated, 
AFJP –the private pension system– Aerolíneas Argentinas and YPF (Petroleum) were 
re-nationalized. The Kirchners also increased taxes on several commodity exports, 
while conflicts with adversaries to their brand of national popular politics increased 
–e.g. agro-exporters, foreign investors, private pension funds and the media industry, 
among many others.
In addition, since regulation is vulnerable to political pressure in Argentina, the 
impact of the political realm on businesses is greater. Frequent changes in the rule of 
law make preferential treatment by government even more important for business. 
Companies that operate in regulated sectors pay special attention to government 
lobbying. As a manager from one of these firms claimed, being well linked to 
government is any firm’s central strategic asset. “It is a question of prevention: the State 
can destroy your business. Your relationship with government has to be well oiled so that you 
do not have problems. Here you cannot do business without the State” (Interview 71, April 
3, 2009). When making the comparison with Chile’s business environment, many 
Argentinean managers interviewed praised their neighbours’ respect for rules and 
private property. They blamed the volatile conditions in Argentina for their insecure 
situation as well as the rent-seeking attitude of local entrepreneurs. 
Tax reform provides a concrete way of contrasting the character of business power 
in Chile and Argentina. Attempts to increase taxation on income and profits in both 
countries over the last two decades produced very different results. Argentina raised 
corporate taxation further than Chile, while increasing the national tax agencies’ 
access to bank information (with the aim of reducing income tax evasion). Despite 
two decades of centre left governments in Chile, firms were effective in preventing 
tax increases above 20 per cent and maintaining the state’s limited access to the bank 
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information of private accounts. According to Fairfield (2010, 2015), the political 
influence of business (its instrumental power) was directly responsible for inhibiting 
reform in these areas. By contrast, a much weaker economic elite in Argentina was 
unable to prevent corporate tax increases. Taxing big business and multinational 
corporations became especially popular in the 2000s –e.g. the unilateral increase of 
taxes on LAN airlines for using land services at Buenos Aires airports (La Tercera, 
2013). Depending on the sector, the income of companies in Argentina might be 
taxed at 35%– such as agro-export businesses. In addition, access to bank information 
was increased after the 2001 crisis, weakening the capacity of the financial sector 
to move capital in secrecy. The first Kirchner government (2003-2007) legislated 
tougher transfer regulations in order to discourage tax evasion involving transactions 
with subsidiaries in tax havens. In Chile, meanwhile, only pressure from the OECD 
since 2009 led to increased access to bank information, and even then the access 
achieved was more limited.
3.3. Symbolic power
Finally, the symbolic power of the capitalist classes also differs in both countries 
during this period. Although the Chilean business class has recently come under 
enormous scrutiny for a series of collusions and corruption scandals, during the 
Concertación years (1990-2010) it managed to become a hugely visible, legitimized 
sector. Indeed, the sector arrived at the pinnacle of political power in Chile with 
the ascension of businessmen Piñera to the presidency. The symbolic power and 
public influence of the Argentinean capitalist class was much limited during the 
post-convertibility years. The credibility of the business class –alongside politicians 
and unions– was widely doubted. Corruption, low patriotism and tax evasion were 
accusations commonly levelled at economic elites. As consequence, entrepreneurs 
in Argentina tended to keep a relatively low profile. 
Entrepreneurs’ search for innovations has been largely identified as one of the 
engines of capitalism. For Schumpeter (1976 [1942]: 83), in particular, capitalism is 
an evolutionary process characterised by a creative-destructive dynamic in which 
the bourgeoisie have the key function of reforming the pattern of production by 
exploiting an invention or by reorganising an industry. But Schumpeter also attributed 
to the bourgeoisie the role to defend capitalist values. In the aftermath of the 1930s 
depression, the growth of monopolies and the increasing intervention of the state 
were seen as constrains for entrepreneurs’ creative destruction process. Schumpeter 
feared that capitalist societies would eventually turn socialist. The bureaucratisation 
of private business and the role played by intellectuals persistently advocating change 
in a socialistic direction threatened capitalism’s legitimacy (1976 [1942]: 145). 
Schumpeter’ anxiety was that modern businessmen were becoming like ordinary 
office workers, losing the passionate fighting spirit of owners. The strata destined to 
defend capitalist values and the importance of entrepreneurs was the bourgeoisie. 
How well Chilean and Argentinean business classes have accomplished this role? 
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The business classes of Chile and Argentina critically differ in their public 
recognition and capacity to defend capitalist values during the period studied 
(1990-2014). Chilean capitalists enjoyed not only a disproportionate concentration 
of wealth (Gini 0.50, World Bank, 2013), but also huge cultural and symbolic power, 
indeed, a position of hegemony. Networks of contacts and influence in different 
social spheres –e.g. political, military, church, media and university– reinforced their 
dominant position (Tironi, 1999). Argentine employers, on the other hand, did not 
experience such a concentration of affluence (Gini 0.42, World Bank, 2013) nor 
did they have comparable influence and visibility. Corruption, low patriotism and 
tax evasion were accusations commonly levelled at the business class in Argentina. 
Unsurprisingly, it is a common view amongst many Argentineans that Argentina is 
‘a country of poor enterprises but rich businessmen’, which evinces the perception 
that firms might easily go bankrupt and fail, while businessmen will always find 
ways of maintaining their private wealth. Some interviewees asserted that ‘anti-
capitalist’ attitudes are to be blamed for the low regard in which the business 
elite is held. For others, businessmen are frowned upon because many got rich in 
obscure ways, paying bribes and using other illicit methods, currying favour with 
the state. This critique gained prominence during the 1990s after several prominent 
entrepreneurs sold recently privatised firms and then transferred their earnings to 
foreign bank accounts, rather than re-investing in the country. Furthermore, the 
social cost of the 2001 crisis reinforced the negative perception of businessmen. As 
an entrepreneur put it: “I don’t say that I’m ‘empresario’ [businessman]. In Argentina, this 
is a bad word. Instead, I present myself as ‘entrepreneur’. Businessmen are frowned upon. It 
means that you evade taxes, have illegally-employed staff, pay bribes, and are cosy with people 
in government who do you favours” (Interview 82, May 17, 2009). It is interesting to 
note the semantic displacement from ‘businessman’ to ‘entrepreneur’ in this quote. If 
businessmen are linked with class, self-interest and narrow moneymaking priorities, 
entrepreneurs are portrayed as generating opportunity and wealth, as adventurers 
and risk takers (Jones & Spencer, 2009). 
In response to the hostile environment for the capitalist class the main during 
the Kirchner years, big businessmen in Argentina tended to keep a low profile. 
With the exception of the business media, they did not frequently appear in the 
public press commenting on current affairs. One interviewee commented that it 
is not convenient for businessmen to show off their success or to be too loud in 
defending their interests in the public domain. The government might increase 
their taxes or regulators might decide to audit their firms more strictly. Alfredo 
Coto, for instance, owner of a supermarket chain and president of IDEA, gave 
an interview on November 18, 2005, before IDEA’s annual meeting, criticising 
the government and projecting 13% inflation for 2006. The Kirchners reacted 
ferociously. No government official attended the conference. “Mr. Coto was seriously 
attacked, and nobody stood up for him. After the conference, he renounced the presidency of 
IDEA, and was the first employer to sign a price agreement with the government. They made 
him lick the ground”, an economic journalist explained (Interview 70, March 25, 
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2009). José Miguel Aranguren, then the president of Shell (now Minister of Energy 
under Macri’s administration), endured a similar experience after challenging 
Kirchner’s call to boycott Shell stations because of a refusal to accept the imposition 
of government price limits in 2005. Consequently, many businesses were subjugated 
by the political power of the Kirchners.
Despite the fact that many businessmen complain about their hostile treatment by 
government officials, some managers assumed responsibility for the low regard in 
which capitalists were held. They claimed that the private sector did not succeed in 
defending its interests, the key responsibility of the business class for Schumpeter. 
For instance, the CEO of a privatised utility firm commented on the inability of 
the business class to secure and legitimise the 1990s reforms: “It was also our own 
fault. We were not able to legitimise the changes introduced. I agree: Menem was corrupt. But 
there was fiscal balance and economic equilibrium. Yet we were not able to defend a constructive 
business environment” (Interview 83, May 20, 2009). Moreover, some businessmen 
interviewed defended themselves by arguing that the recurrent economic crises, 
institutional instability and hostile business conditions have forced them into short-
term and self-centred investment thinking.
If, on the whole, Argentine businessmen were accused of short-term thinking, and 
if their public visibility and influence on government was limited, the contrast with 
Chile during the period (1990-2014) could not be starker. A notion of heroism was 
built up around the business class, especially in economic circuits. Businessmen were 
cast as modernising agents, as the figureheads ‘of the triumphant market economy 
of the 1980s’ (Montero, 1993: 38). Since the 1990s, private firms consolidated a 
leading social role in a country obsessed with economic growth (Tironi, 1999). A 
particular culture of celebrity that surrounds CEOs extended this exultant narrative. 
A dominant pro-business press amplifies their voices, magnifying their influence on 
public discussion (Mönckeberg, 2009). As University Chancellor Andrés Benítez 
noted: “to be presented as a businessman in this country opens doors everywhere. It is worthier 
than being an artist or a writer” (Interview 9, September 27, 2008). And yet after so 
many scandals of corruption and collusion unveiled in the last years one could 
doubt if Benítez would claim the same optimistic vision about the image of Chilean 
businessmen in 2016, the surveys during the period studied were pretty stable about 
this issue. According to Barómetro CERC, between 1996 and 2010, roughly around 
70% of interviewed agreed that “businessmen are the base of he economy and 
generate employment for Chileans: we all benefit from their work”. Only a 30% 
average during the same period considered that “businessmen are only interested in 
their profit, aiming to impose their will, without considering the consequence on 
others” (Huneeus, 2014: 355). 
The Chilean business sector declares that it is proud of its long-term investment 
in the country, portraying itself as a generator of employment and progress. In the 
narratives collected from employers, Thumala notes the high opinion businessmen 
have of themselves: “these men want to be identified with the ideals of professional 
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and ethical superiority and the justification of a government of the best ones” (2007: 
97). This sense of elitism is connected with their powerful social position, but also 
with the hierarchical character of Chilean society. The “government of the best ones” 
as president Piñera proclaimed, was the manifest expression of a feeling of elite, no 
longer founded on the notion of aristocracy, but on business success. As the editor 
of an important economic media outlet commented: “the business community feels a 
sense of responsibility to the country. They have enterprises abroad, but they are proud of living 
in Chile. They distinguish themselves from their Peruvian and Argentine counterparts, who 
live abroad and manage their businesses remotely” (Interview 33, November 28, 2008). 
It is interesting to note, however, that increasing awareness of Chile’s structural 
inequalities and several corruption scandals implicating the business class in various 
industries –e.g. retail, pharmacies, poultry, education, tissue paper, banking, fishery, 
mining– to name just a few, have shattered the reputation of businessmen – as well as 
that of politicians, churches and the justice tribunals (UDP 2015, CERC 2014, CEP 
2015). Different groups have become more likely to agitate for the improvement 
of their social conditions. Recent strikes and protests of subcontracted workers in 
the forestry, retail and mining sectors evince growing concern with the unequal 
position of labour versus capital, and of the regions versus Santiago. Because of the 
continuing power of the private sector, the perception of corporate privilege has 
increasingly begun to provoke ire and distrust. A critical perspective on the business 
class increased markedly during Piñera’s presidency (2010-2014). His government’s 
links with business representatives aroused suspicion that government decisions 
were subordinated to corporate interests. The cycle of mobilisations that gained 
momentum in 2011, with the student movement against the for-profit education 
system, manifested deep dissatisfaction with a neoliberal model that favours big 
business at the expense of a highly indebted citizenry (Mayol, 2012; Han, 2012). 
These events marked not only a sharp decline in the reputation of business, but 
more importantly, a significant change in the public sphere and in how public policy 
is discussed (shifting the centre of debate from growth and poverty to inequality and 
injustice). Citizens increasingly feel entitled to challenge the brand of market rule 
that has reigned in Chile since Pinochet’s dictatorship. 
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Table 1. Features of business sector. 
Argentina Chile
Ideological cohesiveness Fragmentation and rivalry. 
Sectoral defence of interests.
weak public justification.
Ideological and political 
affinity.
Sense of corps and class.
New spirit of capitalism’s 
discourse.
Business politics Contingent partisan 
connection.
Low cross-sectoral 
coordination. 
Partial influence in policies.
Straight partisan connection. 
Powerful business 
associations.
Constant influence in 
policy-making.
Visibility/reputation Infrequent visibility in public 
matters.
Discredited reputation.
High exposure in public 
sphere. 
Questioned reputation. 
Source: Own elaboration in base of material collected.
4. Discussion
This paper has explored the connection between neoliberalism and the capitalist 
classes in Argentina and Chile. In particular, it investigated the legacies of neoliberal 
reforms for capitalist class formation, asking why capitalists were able to achieve a 
hegemonic class position through market reform in Chile though not in Argentina. 
While the existing literature on neoliberalism sheds light on various similarities 
and differences in these countries’ experiences, as Section 2 explored, not enough 
attention has been paid to the role played by the capitalist classes in defending 
business interests and maintaining market reforms. This paper fills that gap. The 
divergent paths of neoliberalism in these countries may be explained by multiple 
factors that go beyond the role of the capitalist classes, such as the political 
conditions under which market reforms were implemented, the concrete outcomes 
of neoliberal reform (2001 crisis vs. capitalist modernization) and varying levels of 
collectivisation and reaction to marketization. However, the differing degrees of 
power exercised by the Argentinean and Chilean business classes in attempting to 
legitimise neoliberal reform and resist collectivist attempts at undoing marketization 
were a fundamental factor in shaping the recent history of each country. 
In comparing the power position of these capitalist classes between 1990-2014 
in reference to ideological cohesiveness, political influence and symbolic power, 
important differences were found. 
Ideologically, while divisiveness and internal competition undermined the capacity 
of the Argentine business sector to build a common agenda, the ideologically 
consistent and politically connected capitalist class in Chile was effective in defending 
pro-business regulations. Between 1990 and 2014 the Argentinean business class was 
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characterised by diverse ideological agendas and factions (e.g. industrialists, agro-
exporters, financiers, commercialists and regionalists) defending their own strategies 
and economic interests. The Chilean business class, by contrast, despite internal 
differences, acted with consistent ideological coherence in defending the subjugation 
of politics to economics, and the power position of capital over labour. Chilean 
capitalists heavily invested in institutions that promoted pro-business interests and 
ideas –e.g. forums, think tanks, and economic media (Undurraga, 2013), playing a 
key role in neutralising criticism, while offering technical support for lobbying in 
the Parliament. This situation was not mirrored in Argentina. Although there were 
many think tanks and pro-business institutions, their capacity to articulate ideas on 
behalf of the entire sector was much more limited. To be fair, the public sphere in 
Argentina was a much more disputed arena during the period, especially after the 
2001 crisis. The frontal attack lead by the Kirchner government on neoliberalism 
(as the source of all evils), and the plurality of intellectual discourses and spaces of 
contestation retrenched the business class to a defensive position (Undurraga, 2014). 
Their ideological entropy only worsened the situation. 
In terms of policy influence, business associations in Chile, under the umbrella of 
CPC, were powerful actors during the period, implementing both structural and 
instrumental power on multiple occasions. Their significant capacity to coordinate 
divergent sectors (e.g. agro-business, banks, mining or industry) and their partisan 
linkages with UDI and RN, and strategic links with Concertación politicians, 
facilitated the defence of business interests in the Parliament for decades. This 
situation also contrasts starkly with that in Argentina, where rivalry and politicisation 
of business representation was the norm –especially during the Kirchner years. 
Despite several attempts to build an economy-wide peak association, the inability to 
reconcile sectorial interests undermined these efforts. As a result, business associations 
did not have the capacity to influence governance at industry level to anywhere 
near a comparable degree. Under the Kirchner governments (2003-2015), pressure 
on the private sector grew steadily. Public service contracts with privatized utilities 
were renegotiated, AFJP –the private pension system– Aerolíneas Argentinas and 
YPF (Petroleum) were re-nationalized. The Kirchners also increased taxes on several 
commodity exports, while conflicts with adversaries over their brand of national 
popular politics increased. 
Finally, the symbolic power of the capitalist classes also differed in both countries 
during this period. Although the Chilean business class has recently come under 
heavy scrutiny for a series of corruption scandals, during the Concertación years 
(1990-2010) it managed to become a hugely visible, legitimized sector. The symbolic 
power and public influence of the Argentinean capitalist class was, by contrast, much 
more limited. The credibility of the business class –alongside politicians and unions– 
was widely doubted. Corruption, low patriotism and tax evasion were accusations 
commonly levelled at economic elites. While Chilean businessmen were highly 
visible and enjoyed a dominant position in most fields of society –i.e. business, 
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politics, media, universities, church, sport– successful entrepreneurs in Argentina 
tended to keep a relatively low profile. 
In the aftermath of the period analysed (1990-2014), the symbolic power of the 
business elites has continued changing in both countries. Despite decades in which 
the Chilean business class ruled comfortably, their hegemony is now challenged 
afresh –at least in symbolic terms. While their structural power, ideological cohesion 
and dominant position in several sectors remains almost untouched, their reputation 
is in question virtually across the board. After a series of corruption scandals 
implicating key business groups–e.g. Matte, Piñera, Luksic, Paulmann, Saieh– in 
which the blatant subordination of the political class to corporate interests became 
evident –e.g. SQM, Penta, Corpesca, Caval– the reputation of the business class has 
been damaged. Chileans see more clearly that the motivations and commitments 
of businessmen do not necessarily align with the interests of the ‘nation’, as is so 
ubiquitously declared, but rather with profit and self-interest. The business class 
is increasingly perceived as abusive, with public image-lynching through social 
media becoming a growing trend. In April 2016, for instance, in the Lower Camera 
Congressman Rivas publicly insulted businessmen Luksic as ‘a son of the bitch’, 
accusing him of being responsible for Santiago’s flooding. Luksic responded through 
a youtube video, appealing to the support of common citizens. Luksic presented 
himself as one of the most powerful citizens in the country, and claimed he was 
tired of being blamed for the injustices of the ‘system’. In social media, however, 
the reaction of scorn lasted for weeks. Few feel compassion for the millionaire’s 
affliction. An episode of this nature would have been unthinkable a decade ago. 
Entrepreneurs in Chile seem to be retrenching to a defensive position. 
Meanwhile, the pendulum in Argentina seems to be swinging the other way. 
With the election of businessmen Macri as president in 2015, the capitalist class 
is in power for the first time in more than half a century. This has boosted the 
visibility of the capitalist class and with it their capacity to define business rules. 
The country has shifted its orientation to international markets, and financial values 
have been given a novel impetus. While it is still too early to fully assess the impact 
of Macri’s government on the power, reputation and coordination of the business 
class, businessmen are clearly in a better position than they were in during the 
Kirchner years, however dispersed their interests may still be, and however agonistic 
the political game remains. We must wait to see how Argentinean society will react 
to a pro-business government, to the rise of prices in public services and to the 
injustices associated with private rule. The appearance of Macri in the Panama 
papers confirmed the suspicions of many Argentineans. It was taken as another 
sign of a discredited business class oriented to avoiding taxes, and little interested in 
national investment. 
As the literature on political scandals has helped us understand (Thompson, 2002; 
Tironi & Cavallo, 2004), symbolic power is fragile. Reputation is a quality that takes 
time and long-term investment to build, but can be shattered quickly in the wake of 
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public scandals, especially in an age obsess with transparency. The reputation of the 
Chilean business class is experiencing serious decline. Despite its growing disrepute, 
however, the structural power of the sector, its ideological unity and well organised 
associations, remain powerful tools for defending a pro-business environment. But 
the environment has changed. Social movements proved that influence over the 
state can undermine elite capacity to maintain the market rule –e.g. changes in 
the education regime after 2011. It will be interesting to see the extent to which 
the guardians of neoliberalism in Chile will be able to contain reactions against 
marketization in light of their newly weakened reputation. 
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